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Abstract
Mona Hatoum's video installation Corps étranger is an example
of an artwork that critically comments on particular aspects of
contemporary visual culture, such as the colonization of the
body's interior by medical image technologies. It has indeed
been interpreted in those terms by several authors from within
the new academic field of Visual Culture. Here it is argued that
the critical cultural impact of the installation might be more
fully described when one grants art a relative autonomy within
the cultural field and, moreover, draws on concepts from more
traditional academic disciplines and approaches, such as
aesthetics and phenomenology. Art is a cultural practice that is
deeply involved in contemporary life and its hierarchies and
differences, but that, nevertheless, can be critical by
generating new experiences. I would like to describe this
relative autonomy with the help of the concepts of play and of
aesthetic reflexivity.
Key Words
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1. Corps étranger[1]
Mona Hatoum's installation Corps étranger (1994) consists of a
relatively small, oval-shaped space with two entrances. On the
floor of the installation visitors see a luminous circle consisting
of moving video images. The images, hard to decipher at first,
show close ups of the human skin and of the inner cavities of
the body. The camera circles around body orifices, enters,
explores subterranean tunnels with moist, sometimes hairy
surfaces, and then leaves again. One sees soft, glowing
colours, shiny surfaces, erotic images of what at the same time
remains somewhat repulsive. As the space of the installation is
quite narrow, the visitor is almost forced to stand upon the
image. The ambiance is slightly suffocating, also because of
the continuous sounds of heartbeat and breathing.
It is a troubling experience, bordering on the tasteless. Some
critics have accused the artist of being facile, using the
sensational impact of highly advanced medical visualization
techniques to impress and shock the public. I think that she
achieved a bit more than that. The installation stages an
ambiguous experience that thematizes some very fundamental
distinctions and boundaries involved in our feelings of
subjective embodiment: those between inside and outside;
feeling and seeing; self and other; intimacy and alienation;
private and public; attraction and disgust; fascination and
abjection. These distinctions are constitutive for all our
experiential relations to our own bodies and those of others.
Here they are mobilised to foreground specifically our relation
to the body's interior. The installation evokes the highly
ambivalent feelings we usually have with respect to our own
interior physicality, let alone that of others: ranging from fear
or disgust to fascination, wonder or lust.
2. Visual art as visual culture
Hatoum uses a very sophisticated medical imaging technique,
video-endoscopy. The endoscope is an instrument for the
inspection of the inner cavities of the body, in its simplest
forms consisting of a tube or cable, a light source, lenses and a
viewer. It can be inserted though the natural orifices of the
body, like the vagina or the rectum, of through a small
incision. Since it has become possible to attach a very small
photo or video camera, it is not only a perceptual but also a
representational technique, providing stills or life video images
on a television screen. It is used for diagnostic purposes but
also as a technique for surgery, as the tube that conducts the
television cable can also be used to insert surgical instruments.
Endoscopy is used in a great variety of medical specialisms,
such as internal medicine, gynaecology, urology and orthopedic
surgery.[2]
Today, endoscopic images of the body's interior are hardly as
spectacular as they were ten years ago, when Corps étranger
was made. Since then, endoscopic images have become
familiar to the public, for instance because they are repeatedly
shown in popular medical television programmes. They have
contributed to what José van Dijck has called "the myth of the
transparent body": the idea that the body can be seen through
completely without damage and is therefore also 'makeable'
through and through, that is: can be repaired and improved
upon at will.[3] In contrast to this culturally dominant myth,
however, another one has emerged, that of the fragmented
and colonised body. Medical visualization techniques like
endoscopy seem to fit seamlessly in critical discussions of the
post- or transhuman. As they expose what was hitherto
invisible to an objectifying visual regime, they are considered
to further the colonization of body's interior by techno-scientific
discourses and practices. In the context of the development of
a global electronic and digital information and communication
system, on the one hand, and the development of
biotechnology and artificial reproduction techniques on the
other, this would result in the final demise of what was still left
of the modern subject.
It is very well possible to interpret Hatoum's installation as an
artwork that criticises contemporary visual culture, its
representational conventions and the power structures
operative in these. It has been thus interpreted, for instance in
two introductions in the new academic field of Visual Culture:
Nicholas Mirzoeff's An Introduction to Visual Culture (1999)
and Marita Sturken's and Lisa Cartwright's Practices of Looking
(2001). Visual Culture as an academic 'discipline' (between
quotation marks, because it claims to be an interdisciplinary
endeavour) seems to exist in two varieties: on the one hand as
a theory-oriented branch of art history working with
poststructuralist semiotics and psycho-analysis; on the other
as a part of the rather more sociologically based field of
cultural studies, focusing on the predominant presence of the
visual and the image in contemporary culture. What both
strands have in common, is the questioning of the autonomous
status and distinctive position of art. Bryson, Holly and Moxey,
for instance, editors of a well-known series on visual culture
and visual theory, emphatically define their subject as a history
of images rather than art works.[4] And whereas they still
choose relatively canonical works for their analyses, these are
treated as representations with a certain cultural significance,
rather than as masterpieces with distinctively and intrinsically
aesthetic values. In the same spirit, Sturken and Cartwright
write that their approach "emphasizes less the distinction of art
and more its interactions with other aspects of visual
culture."[5] Mirzoeff tells us that there is no going beyond the
cultural framework and that the assertion of the importance of
art, as against other products of culture, should itself be
explained in cultural terms.[6] In these accounts aesthetics, in
the sense of the philosophical reflection on art, is mainly
portrayed as the traditional legitimization of art's distinctive
status in terms of universal and intrinsic qualities such as
beauty.
When we turn to Hatoum's installation, explanations that focus
on its relations to the broader visual culture certainly bring us
a lot. Mirzoeff places the work in a context of changing
relations between the real and the virtual as a consequence of
the digitalization of the image. In postmodern visual culture
the body is no longer the obvious and natural boundary
between the objective world outside and subjective inner
experience. The body has become a fluid and hybrid zone in
between inside and outside, just as changeable as other
cultural artefacts, just as thoroughly determined by
representational conventions, just as liable to manipulation.
What the images of the camera show, according to Mirzoeff, is
mainly absence. For centuries we have longed to look into the
mind of the artist. Now we look into her body and find nothing
but absence: the body has become virtual.[7]
Sturken and Cartwright discuss Hatoum's work in the context
of the scientific gaze, which they explain in Foucaultian terms.
Modern knowledge practices privilege sight, especially the sight
of what lies beneath the surface. Medical visualization
techniques such as ultrasound, endoscopy and MRI do what
photography did in the nineteenth century: visualise what was
hitherto invisible and provide new means to categorise and
typify human beings in terms of hierarchical differences. In this
context, Corps étranger becomes a political commentary: the
body is represented as an arena for a battle of meanings. The
title would refer to the camera as the strange body invading
one's own body and threatening its identity and existence.[8]
Mirzoeff and Sturken and Cartwright might be considered as
examples of the cultural studies variety of Visual Culture. A
somewhat older reading by Ewa Lajer-Burcharth (1997) comes
closer to the art historical strand. Lajer-Burchart interprets the
installation in terms of the Lacanian real: the psychic register
that, as it is excluded from the symbolic order, remains
inaccessible to the subject, but still determines its functioning
to a large extent. In present day visual culture the monitor has
replaced the mirror as the cultural site where the imaginary
identifications take place that are formative for subjective
identity or its displacement. We have become colonised by the
technologies of the visual: "From internet to bioscan, visuality
seeps into you, taking over your 'own' corporeal domain - you
may have already become nothing but a website not just for
others but even for yourself."[9] In this context, Hatoum's
installation reflects on this development by exploring the
borders of what is culturally meaningful and what isn't. Her
images are 'obscene', both in the sense of unclean, gross and
sexually threatening, as in the sense of 'beyond the scene' -
beyond the arena of shared meanings. The installation evokes
and confronts three visual regimes, three institutionalised ways
of looking that generate meaning but in this installation
obstruct each other: the aesthetic gaze of the video projection,
the clinical gaze of endoscopy and the pornographic gaze of the
peepshow. But none of these gazes really works. The aesthetic
gaze does not work, because the spectator is not allowed to
immerse herself comfortably in the images and derive a
narcissistic satisfaction from the experience - if only because
she has to look downwards and almost stands upon the
images. The pornographic gaze does not work, because the
body orifices are divested of any erotic connotation and refuse
phantasies of control, possession or penetration. Finally, the
clinical gaze does not work, because the eye of the camera
moves too erratically to get a grip on what is shown. Because
all these signifying ways of looking are obstructed, the
installation evokes what is beyond meaning: the Lacanian real,
the kind of bodily experience that one does not recognise as
one's own but tends to exclude from one's corporeal identity -
a meaningless excess.
What these three commentaries have in common is that they
'read' Hatoum's work as a critical reflection on, and
intervention in, contemporary visual culture. They interpret the
work's cultural significance in broader terms than that of the
artistic and biographical history of its maker, the history of art,
or the subjective aesthetic experience of the recipient.
Moreover, they conceive of visual culture not only in terms of
representational conventions, but also in terms of constructive
technologies and the visual regimes these technologies
engender. This means that they are able to formulate a theory
of visual culture that is more than a semiotic universe of
representational contents: visual culture is also a matter of
'practices of looking', which means that it includes the
corporeal and subjective involvement of its participants. This
approach has the advantage of taking art seriously as a form of
critical reflection on contemporary culture. But there is also
something missing. As long as one primarily refers to dominant
cultural discourses and practices to explain a work like this,
one lacks a theoretical framework and vocabulary to articulate
what new meanings it engenders. And indeed: Mirzoeff finds
merely absence, Sturken and Cartwright focus on the invasion
of the body by the camera and Lajer-Burcharth refers to what
is inexpressible per definition: the Lacanian real. As they are
not able to explain whether, why and to what extent this work
succeeds in making one experience something new with regard
to one's feeling of embodiment, they ignore a part of the
work's critical potential.
3. Art as play
To be able to do so, one should claim a kind of relative
autonomy for art and the history of its production and
reception, and conceive of it as a meaning generating practice
that at least partially works on its own terms. Not because that
would be a universally valid constitutive condition for
something to be 'art,' issuing either from the works intrinsic
properties or from the way it is contemplated. The claim does
not imply a kind of essentialist definition. It is a normative
claim: one wants art to have this relative autonomy because
one values the kind of meaning making that it makes possible.
Just because art is a cultural practice deeply involved in
contemporary life and its hierarchies and differences, it needs
its own momentum to be able to do what it is so very well able
to do: to be critical by means of its experiential appeal. And I
would like to describe this relative autonomy with the help of
the concepts of play and of aesthetic reflexivity.
A fruitful way of thinking the critical potential of art has been
proposed by Isobel Armstrong in her book The Radical
Aesthetic. Armstrong advocates a re-evaluation of the
aesthetic as a democratic and emancipating discourse. A
radical aesthetic does not deny the reality of social and cultural
conflict, as conservatism does, but neither does it get stuck in
the unmediated confrontation of irreconcilable positions she
reproaches poststructuralism (we might consider the Lacanian
'real,' that what remains outside all signification, as an
example of such an opposition). A radical aesthetic starts from
'the broken middle,' a concept Armstrong borrows from Gillian
Rose. This is a form of dialectical thinking that does not believe
in a conciliatory 'Aufhebung' of opposites, but sees dialectics
rather as a restructuring of relations starting from the place of
this broken middle. This restructuring is often painful, but
enables a transformation of both opposite terms without
denying the conflict between them. Armstrong uses Rose's
notion by grounding her aesthetics on the idea of play as an
activity that is affective, imaginative and cognitive and that has
the capacity to transform the structure of perception. In the
play of the aesthetic new experiences may be generated in
which the conflict between opposites is not resolved, but in
which the categories in which the opposites are thought and
experienced are being transformed. Art's political relevance is
in learning to play with contradictions and paradoxes and in
this way instigating cultural transformations. "The aesthetic is
not the political, but it may make the political possible."[10]
When we consider Hatoum's installation as a transformational
play, we see that it does something that is not usual either in
the clinical gaze of endoscopy, nor in the pornographic gaze of
the peepshow, nor in the aesthetic gaze of the gallery: it
presses the visitor upon the image and encloses her in too
close an embrace, because its space is so narrow and the body
sounds are so pervasive. It is impossible to distance oneself.
And the images do not fit into these three practices either, as
they are both distasteful and attractive. The spectator is
sucked in, encapsulated in the voyage of the camera; a camera
that is not only a strange invader, but also a fascinated,
searching, touching and sensitive eye. The boundaries between
one's own body and that of the other dissolve, making one
more aware of the position of one's body against that of the
other and against oneself. Considered as a play the work can
be understood as creating room for new experiences by
transgressing habitual distinctions and behaviours. It enforces
a certain indeterminateness, but not because it is
indeterminate: play is always formally structured and governed
by rules. It is because these structures and rules are different
from those applying to every day life, that a play constitutes
itself as play and creates an opening in time and space where
the indeterminate may be sensed and valued as such and new
experiences may arise.
But again the concept of play is not enough to articulate the
experiences the work generates. One needs a
phenomenological vocabulary to describe concrete and specific
experiential situations and compare them with each other, both
in terms of their sensuous, affective and perceptual contents
and in their structures. One can come to interesting
conclusions then. For instance: in clinical practice, visualization
techniques as endoscopy and ultrasound do not function only
as perceptual technologies, but are representational and
communication technologies as well. What the camera sees is
projected on a screen and made visible for more than one
spectator and sometimes also for the patient. In that case,
which becomes less and less unusual, the relation between the
perceived and the perceiver is has a different structure than in
the gallery or in the peepshow in which the perceived body
does not see itself. Medical visualization techniques like
endoscopy and ultrasound create a new experiential possibility,
namely to watch your own insides in 'real time.' This is seldom
an agreeable experience: maybe only in the case of a healthy
pregnancy. The observation of one's worn-out backbone,
blocked ovary or even healthy colon remains somewhat
horrific. Moreover, it is an experience that takes place in a very
specific setting: the objectifying and hierarchical setting of a
diagnostic laboratory or hospital. One possible way to
encounter the humiliation and the shame of such an experience
is to talk about it. Another is to visualise differently. This is
where the specific sensuous qualities of Hatoum's images, their
montage and their projection acquire a positive cultural
significance: as the articulation of a distinctive form of aisthesis
that goes beyond culturally dominant conceptions of the body's
interior.
4. Perceptual and communicative mediation
The critical impact of Corps étranger might be clarified by
comparing it with the way endoscopic images mediate
subjective embodiment in clinical practices, in terms of both
perceptual structure and content. Don Ihde distinguishes two
ways in which perceptual technologies mediate perception. In
the embodiment relation, one encounters the world through a
piece of machinery.[11] The machine functions as a more or
less transparent extension of the body and the mediated
experience is of the same kind as the experience without the
instrument. Typical examples are microscopes or glasses: they
mediate visual experience visually. When we have the
experience of perceiving a machine that perceives the world
and have to read what it tells us to infer its perceptions, Ihde
speaks of a hermeneutic relation. In the hermeneutic relation
the signs indicating the experience are of a different kind than
the experience itself. A typical example is the thermometer,
which indicates temperature not by means of temperature, but
by means of visual signs or digital numbers. Mediation is
always to some extent transformation, as mediating
instruments amplify some perceptible aspects of the world and
reduce other aspects; invite some forms of action and inhibit
other actions.[12]
However, one could say that with the introduction of the photo
or video camera something has changed in the
phenomenological structure and the cultural significance of
endoscopy. We are not only dealing with a gaze that through a
piece of machinery is directed to a particular body part that is
its intentional goal. What this gaze perceives is expressed as
well: it is projected or otherwise made visible on a screen and
thereby made accessible for other gazes than that of the
endoscopist or surgeon. And in some clinical situations the
image is indeed meant to be collectively scrutinised and
discussed: with other members of the medical staff and
sometimes with the patient as well. So what is mediated is not
only the perception of the diagnostician or surgeon, it is also
the communication between the doctor and other doctors or
the doctor and the patient. The perceptual instrument becomes
part of a medium and the image is not only mediated but also
medialised.
If we follow Vivian Sobchack's analysis of the
phenomenological structure of the film experience, we will
have to introduce a third kind of embodied subject into the
operation room, in addition to the doctors and the patients,
and that is the endoscopic imagery itself as a technologically
embodied gaze. According to Sobchack, watching a film is a
dialectic exchange between two subjects: the spectator and the
film. The film is an intentional subject in its own right, as it
perceives a visible and audible world and expresses its
perception in visible images and sounds. It displays an
independent subjectivity, showing the activity of seeing "from
inside." In its movements and transitions we see that it directs
its attention, makes choices, and thereby values and signifies.
The film is a stream of moving images that we interpret as a
world perceived by a mobile and incorporated gaze. This is not
the gaze of the filmmaker, nor that of (one of) the characters,
because it has a particular embodiment through the
technological mediation of the camera and the projection - an
embodiment that allows it to see and express the world
differently than human subjects do.
We have access to the gaze of the film as if "from within."
Nevertheless, it is never completely our gaze, because it has
its own, independent embodiment. There remains a certain
distance between the viewing position constructed by the film
and the viewing position occupied by the film's spectator: "the
concretely embodied situation of the film's vision also stands
against the viewer."[13] The spectator, absorbed as she can
be, never completely identifies the gaze of the film with her
own gaze. Therefore, the spectator's experience of the film is
always ambivalent. The spectator witnesses the film's seeing of
the world as if "from within." Therefore he or she can
experience the filmmaker's and the camera's perceptions as
"quasi-mine," as a quasi-embodiment relation. But it is also
hermeneutic: the spectator always sees both the film's world
and the film's seeing of the world as distinct from his own
seeing of this seeing.
The patient can be compared to the spectator of a film. She
might have the same kind of quasi-embodiment/hermeneutical
relation to what she sees as watching a movie, with one
important difference: the world she sees expressed on the
screen consists of her own body. She has an existential relation
to what she sees. On the one hand, the patient shares the
endoscopic gaze. She sees - or learns to see, when the image
is explained to her - to look at her body through the eyes of
the camera. At the same time, she will always see the
camera's seeing, that is, she will remain aware of the fact that
what she sees is the camera's vision. Her experience of her
body never completely coincides with the camera's perception
of it. Which also means that it can never be reduced to it:
subjective embodiment results from an exchange with, not a
determination by a dominant representational regime. Even if
"visuality seeps into you," as Lajer-Burcharth wrote, it does not
inevitably take over one's entire corporeal domain.
5. Corps étranger as transformational play
But in what way does Corps étranger play with the ambivalent
experience of this clinical practice? Firstly, by realigning the
body's boundaries. If we take as a starting point the
description of open surgery by medical anthropologist Stefan
Hirschauer, we could say that in normal surgical operations the
boundaries of the patient's body are extended. In "The
Manufacture of Bodies in Surgery," Hirschauer describes (open)
surgical operations as encounters between two kinds of
disciplined bodies: parcelled patient bodies and aggregated
surgical bodies.[14] Both are corporate bodies in the sense of
Latour: hybrid constellations of human and non-human
'actants.' Both kinds of bodies have undergone various
perceptual and functional transformations. The patient's body
is turned into an object, immobilised by narcosis, dissociated
from her person; she is limited visually to the region to be
operated. The surgeon's body as well is limited visually and in
mobility by her uniform. She incorporates new executive
organs, however, consisting of instruments and machinery and
also of the hands and organs of other members of the staff,
like assistants and nurses. The operating team acts as a
"surgical body," internally articulated in terms of division of
labour and hierarchy. The patient's body in contrast is
externalised, in order to maintain and even increase its passive
forces. Its muscles and joints, its breathing, the circulation of
its bodily fluids and its life signs are dispersed over a number
of external contraptions: the mechanisms of the operation
table, a system of tubes, a respiratory machine, several
monitors and digital displays. The boundaries of the patient-
body have been extended - in fact the boundaries of the
operating rooms, protected by a zone of sterility procedures,
act as a substitute skin, protecting the patient body against
outside dangers such as infection. When one enters the
operating room, one enters the patient's body.
If Hirschauer is right in considering the boundaries of the
operating theatre as a kind of second skin around the helpless
and scattered fragments of the patient's body, endoscopy
creates a situation in which the patient can be a spectator in
the spectacle of her own dispersed embodiment. Her
embodiment is doubled: her physical body is part of a larger
hybrid body. And in this larger, hybrid body, the visualization
of her insides is a spectacle within a spectacle. But although
she can neither control what is going on in this larger body, nor
the visualization of her insides, her presence and her
perception cannot be ruled out. With local anaesthesia and in
front of a screen, she has to made part of the situation and of
the discourse in the operating room. The images have to be
explained to her; and she and the operating staff have to find a
way to deal with the difficult feelings that may be generated by
the public display of one's insides.
In open surgery, the patient is subject to a double kind of
treatment. During the induction of narcosis, she is on the one
hand manipulated as a body and marginalised as a participant.
On the other hand she is talked with, and taken into account as
a person. Once she is 'gone', however, she is no longer talked
with, but only talked about. Yet, even then she is a virtual
participant. Although the patient is not present as a social
actor, she is not completely absent either. In this talk about
her, she is referred to in an indeterminate way by the
operating team, "comparable to our style of talking about a
third party without being sure s/he is out of earshot."[15] The
patient's absence as a person is partly necessary to facilitate
the operation. But it is also necessary to protect her as a
person. "A body cut open and laid bare internally - with organs
hanging out or dragged out - is more than naked. Its
inhabitant would be seized with fear and dismay, but would
also act with a different social affect already required for states
of lesser disarray of one's appearance: shame. Patients may
lose all sorts of organs in the operating theatre; without
narcosis they would lose their face. So what seems to sever
patients as persons from the social situation also serves to
protect them as persons."[16] Although an endoscopic
operation is less messy than open surgery, the feelings
involved can be very ambivalent as well. Maud Radstake has
reported, for instance, that in the case of endoscopic
examinations of the rectum, patients feel embarrassed when
their bowels are not free from excrements.[17] This suggests
that the myth of the transparent body, pervasive as it might
be, has not resulted in a dispassionate view of one's own
insides and its workings.
As visitors of Corps étranger we are in a different situation
than the patient in the operating room: it is after all Hatoum's
inner body we see, not our own. But displaying the images in
the way she does, Hatoum makes us feel the awkward
intimacy of this constellation. Whereas in the apparently
neutral constellation of the operating room the patient's body
is fragmented, here the boundaries of the room are too close
to forget that we have entered the zone of another's privacy.
And that awareness could be reversed as well: that other body
also intrudes upon our own corporeality, as it encapsulates our
bodies and gazes and hearing. Moreover, it needs very little
empathic effort to imagine that these images might have been
made of our own body. Within this enforced intimacy, however,
our sensuousness is mediated as well. One could say that the
possibility of visualising the body's inside mobilises two
contrasting cultural definitions of the inner body that are both
equally alienating: the inner body as functional instrument that
can be made transparent objectively, and the inner body as the
unspeakable and abject that falls outside all cultural
conceptualization and visualization. Hatoum's installation may
be seen as an attempt to transform this contradiction by
providing a different form of gaze and a different aesthetics in
which the awkwardness of the experience is not denied but
transposed to a different sensuous mode. In Corps étranger,
the object is eroticised - but not in terms of possession or
penetration, but of a sensuous fascination.[18] It becomes
attractive without losing its strangeness or dangerousness,
seductive in its repugnance.
So, on different levels, Hatoum's installation allows its visitors
to articulate an experiential relation to their interior bodies that
is distinct from, and therefore critical of what happens in
clinical practice. But this articulation only works in so far as we
engage in the installation as art: that is as a experiential play
in which the nature and development of our sensuous and
affective experience is noticed as such and is considered to be
meaningful. The sensuousness of the work is self-reflective,
not because it is so by nature, but because that is part of the
cultural practice of art.
6. Aesthetic reflexivity
The point is that it is not only important that such experiences
occur, but also that they are noticed and understood as being
meaningful. Aesthetic appeal only becomes critical when its
appreciation is in some way or another self-conscious. One has
to be aware that something is happening with one's feelings
and perceptions and that that is significant in one way or the
other. One should not only have experiences, but experience
them as experiences. There has to be a form of relatedness to
oneself, a self-reflexivity. Usually this relatedness or self-
reflexivity is conceived of as being mediated by a form of
representation: by the concept (or deictic term) 'I,' for
instance, or by an image, such as Lacan's mirror image. I
would argue however that the kind of self-relatedness that is
mobilised in aesthetic reflexivity is not mediated by
representations, and is in that respect immediate. It is,
however, mediated in another way: in its performance,
attitude, style or form. In arguing this, I will turn to Lyotard,
but also extend his thinking in a phenomenological direction.
Writing about the receptivity of reflective thinking, in his
Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Lyotard introduces a
notion that allows for a certain orientation of thinking in its
sensitive mode: the tautegorical. In reflective thinking the soul
is in a state of pleasure or displeasure and at the same time it
is aware of its state. Thought finds here a subjective, sensible
form of heuristic orientation. Not by taking distance and
overlooking the scene, but by sensing its own state in being
affected by its own activity: "Any act of thinking is thus
accompanied by a feeling that signals to thought its "state."
But this state is nothing other than the feeling that signals it.
For thought, to be informed of its state is to feel this state - to
be affected. [. . .] Such is the first characteristic of reflection: a
dazzling immediacy and a perfect coincidence of what feels and
what is being felt."[19] According to Lyotard, the secret of
Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgement is that it discloses how
critical thinking in general proceeds: by sensing the state in
which it finds itself in the occurrence of thinking. The
distinction between active and passive is not at issue here.
There is something of both, as it is in the activity of thinking
that the soul is being passively affected.
This means that thinking implies a sentient form of relating to
itself that is not itself a form of thinking. The difference of the
tautegorical self-relation with Kant's "Ich denke" of the Kritik
der reinen Vernunft is that the first is not mediated by a
conceptual or other kind of representation. Whereas Kant's
"Ich denke" is a thinking that thinks itself in its activity, the
tautegorical is a thinking that feels itself in its activity. The first
self-relation asks for a representation: "die Vorstellung Ich
denke (. . .) die alle anderen muβ begleiten können,"[20] the
second doesn't. The relation of feeling that is at issue in the
tautegorical might involve a form of mediation, but not
necessarily a mediating concept or image or idea intervening in
between the sensing and the sensed. Moreover, it is a form of
reflexivity that does not require a mental or optical distance to
be discriminating. Quite the contrary, the distinction between
pleasure and displeasure can only be felt in the coincidence of
the sensing and the sensed.
The concept of the tautegorical is not necessarily confined to
the act of thinking. One may apply it to the domain of the
aesthetic as well (think of the reversibility of perceiving and
perceived in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy) as the awareness of
feeling oneself seeing, touching, moving or listening. Whereas
Lyotard's tautegorical was a thinking that felt itself in its
activity, here we could talk of a feeling that thinks itself, or is
at least aware of itself as it occurs. When this awareness is
mobilised in the appreciation of art, I would like to call it
aesthetic reflexivity. Aesthetic reflexivity is of course mediated
in that it is part of a cultural practice, that of art. But an
experience can be mediated in some respects and immediate in
others. On the level of the experience of the individual
spectator, it is both. The relation to one's own feelings is a
coincidence of the sensing and the sensed and is immediately
felt. But - and here I depart from Lyotard - what is
immediately felt is at the same time mediated, because the
feeling is performed in a certain way and this performance is
staged. The play one engages in is carefully structured by the
work, the images possessing the sensuous qualities they have,
the editing displaying a certain rhythm, the projection on the
floor and the placement of installation walls bringing the
spectator close. Moreover, one is aware of one's feelings as
being meaningful in the act of performing them. It is by virtue
of this mediated immediacy that aesthetic reflexivity is a
necessary constituent of aesthetic appreciation and
interpretation, but also of any possible experiential
transformations engendered by artistic play.
Visual art is indeed a form of visual culture and should be
understood in terms of visual culture, but not all forms of
visual culture work in the same way. As W.J.T. Mitchell has
recently written: "The fact that some scholars want to open up
the domain of images to consider both artistic and non-artistic
images does not automatically abolish the difference between
these domains. One could as easily argue that, in fact, the
boundaries of art/non-art only become clear when one looks at
both sides of this ever-shifting border and traces the
transactions and translations between them." [21] In
comparing Hatoum's use of endoscopic images with the way
these images function in clinical practice, a crucial distinction
between artistic and non-artistic use of images emerged. In
clinical situations we try to avoid or forget or resolve awkward
feelings, in art we cherish them. We enter an installation with
the expectation of being affected and of treating our feelings as
being part of the work's meaning. This attitude is of course not
enough: the work has to provide us with a mise-en-scene and
an imagery that is rich and fascinating enough to instigate
feelings we can reflect upon. And this is what makes Mona
Hatoum's installation not only a work of art, but a good work of
art as well.
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